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Trusted Computing
• We start by introducing the notion of Trusted Computing.
• The notion originates from the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) 
– in fact from its predecessor body, the TCPA.
• The first fruits of what has been a large scale research and 
development effort are now visible in the form of a secure chip 
on the motherboards of many new PCs.
• Microsoft Vista incorporates support for these chips, and uses 
them as the basis of certain novel security functions.
• Open source software also exists capable of exploiting this 
hardware.
• However, the full potential remains to be exploited.
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A trusted system
• A trusted system or component is one that behaves in the 
expected manner for a particular purpose.
[Trusted Computing Group – www.trustedcomputinggroup.org]
• This is difficult to achieve this for a PC – where typically there is 
no way of telling whether the ‘real’ (uncorrupted) Windows is 
running.
• As a result there is no way of getting any confidence in the 
correct running of applications.  [Even if the operating system 
says that everything is OK, then this does not help because it 
cannot be believed].
• It is even more difficult to prove to a third party that the state 
of a PC is as claimed.
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Fundamental requirements
• First we need a way of achieving assurance that the operating 
system has booted correctly.
• This requires assuming that the PC hardware has not been 
modified; this is made difficult, but not impossible, for the 
attacker by embedding key functions in a dedicated chip – the 
Trusted Platform Module (TPM).
• Need a way of checking the boot process.
• The component that checks the initial boot must be trusted –
the ‘Core Root of Trust’ – this is hardware-based.
• If the loaded software has been checked (and hence is reliable),
it can check the next software to be loaded, and again there is a 
solid basis for trust; this process is iterated.
www.opentc.net 28 March 2007 7
Monitoring the checking
• As well as performing checks during the boot process, there 
needs to be a reliable way of recording the results of each of 
these checks.
• The trusted hardware incorporates hardware registers which 
store hash-codes of software that has been loaded – these 
registers provide a reliable record of all the software that has
been executed on the trusted platform.
• Anyone wishing to check the state of the platform only needs to 
be given the contents of these registers (as long as they know 
what the values ‘ought to be’).
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Building on the trusted base
• This base of trust can be used to support two fundamental 
trusted computing functions:
– Attestation, where a PC can reliably attest to its software state to 
a third party (by describing the contents of the registers which
store hashes of software state);
– Secure storage, where a PC can store data in such a way that 
only if the PC is in a specific trusted state will the data be 
decrypted and available to an application (by linking the decryption 
keys to specific register contents).
• We now look in a little more detail at the set of technical 
functions provided by trusted computing (as needed to support 
the fundamentals we have outlined).
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Components of a trusted computing 
framework
• Shielded locations and protected capabilities:
– Protected capabilities are those capabilities whose correct operation is 
necessary for the platform to be trusted;
– Shielded locations are areas in which data is protected against 
interference or snooping;
– Only protected capabilities have access to shielded locations.
• Attestation:
– Attestation by the TPM;
– Attestation to a trusted platform (incorporating a TPM);
– Attestation of a trusted platform;
– Authentication of a trusted platform.
• Integrity measurement, storage and reporting.
[TCG specification Architecture Overview]
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Current platforms with integrated TPMs
Hardware
Operating system
Applications
Data
TPM
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Envisaged trusted platforms (stage 1)
Hardware
Operating system
Applications
Data
TPM
CRTM
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Envisaged trusted platforms (stage 2)
Hardware
Virtual machine monitor/ Hypervisor/ Isolation layer
Data-1
Application-a
Application-b
Guest OS
TPM CRTM
Data-2
Application-c
Application-d
Guest OS
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Envisaged trusted platforms (stage 3)
Hardware (including hardware support for isolation –
CPU, chipset, keyboard, mouse, video graphics card
extensions)
Virtual machine monitor/ Hypervisor/ Isolation layer
Data-1
Application-a
Application-b
Guest OS
TPM
Data-2
Application-c
Application-d
Guest OS
CRTM and DRTM
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The TCPA
• TCPA (Trusted Computing Platform Alliance): An industry 
working group.
• Focus: Enhancing trust and security in computing platforms.
• Originally an alliance of promoter companies (HP, IBM, Intel and
Microsoft).  Founded in 1999.
• Initial draft standard unveiled in late 1999.
• Invitation then extended to other companies to join the alliance.
• Specification eventually became an open industry standard.
• By 2002 the TCPA had over 150 member companies.
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The TCG
• TCG: announced April 8, 2003.
• TCPA recognised TCG as successor organisation for the 
development of trusted computing specifications.
• TCG adopted the specifications of the TCPA.
• Aims:
– To extend the specifications for multiple platform types;
– To complete software interface specifications to facilitate 
application development and interoperability;
– To ensure backward compatibility.
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The TCG main specifications
• TCG TPM main specification (general platform specification) 
version 1.2:
– Design principles;
– Structures of the TPM;
– TPM commands.
• TCG software stack (TSS) specification version 1.2.
• TCG software stack (TSS) specification header file.
• Specifications available at:
• www.trustedcomputinggroup.org
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Microsoft Vista security features
• BitLocker – secure drive encryption using TPM features.
• BitLocker only available in Enterprise version of Vista.
• Almost certainly because it is very dangerous to users unless a 
proper backup strategy is also deployed.
• Visa also supports a TPM-based ‘partial’ secure boot.
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Windows Vista BitLocker
• BitLocker Drive Encryption (BDE) designed to protect data from 
offline viewing – uses a v1.2 TPM:
– There is a potentially huge threat from offline attacks against PC 
data, particularly on notebook PCs;
– Bonus: secure decommissioning by deleting the keys!
• Two volume categories:
– System volume (unencrypted)
• MBR, Boot manager and utilities
– OS volume
• OS, page/temp/hibernation file, data
• Five default key storage options:
– TPM, TPM+PIN, TPM+USB, USB, Recovery password
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A crypto chip in every PC
• Putting a TPM on every PC motherboard means that every PC 
will have a crypto chip, with secure key storage, a random 
number generator, …
• Possible security applications for such a chip are almost endless.
• For example, currently there are PC crypto boards available.
• These can be used to make a PC into a secure system, e.g. to:
– run a Certification Authority as part of a PKI;
– to perform key management functions for a company network;
– …
• In some cases, the TPM may be sufficiently secure to avoid the 
need for a separate crypto board.
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Managing distributed systems
• In the long term, one of the key roles envisaged for trusted 
computing is to enable the secure management of distributed 
systems (especially in a corporate setting).
• One node in the distributed system can test the level of security 
offered by another node before deciding what types of task it 
can safely delegate to that node.
• That is, security policies can be automatically enforced.
• However, there is a long way to go …
www.opentc.net 28 March 2007 23
Other applications
• A huge variety of applications have been suggested for trusted 
computing functionality.
• Examples include:
– secure signature generation;
– digital rights management (DRM);
– secure identities for peer-to-peer computing;
– control of personal information;
– …
• However, what will actually happen is far from clear!
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Security infrastructures
• In order to use cryptography to protect communications, some 
kind of security infrastructure needs to be in place.
• In its simplest form, this will just be a means to set up shared
secret keys between communicating parties.
• Traditionally, e.g. in banking networks, this can be achieved 
using one or more Trusted Third Parties (TTPs).
• One type of TTP for this purpose is known as a Key Distribution 
Centre (KDC).
• A KDC shares a secret key with every party, and these keys can 
be leveraged (using an appropriate protocol) to set up a secret 
key between any two parties.
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Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs)  I
• A PKI is another type of security infrastructure, based on public 
key cryptography.
• In public key cryptography, each party has a key pair, made up 
of a matching public key (which can be widely disseminated) 
and a private key (known only to its owner).
• Such key pairs can support the use of digital signatures.
• The owner of a private key can digitally sign a message using 
this private key.
• The resulting signature can be verified by anyone with the 
correct public key (but cannot be forged with just the public 
key).
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Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs)  II
• Whilst the public key does not need to be kept secret, the users need 
to know that the public key they have is correct.
• This can be achieved by using a special type of TTP known as a 
Certification Authority (CA).
• The CA takes a public key which it knows to belong to user X, and 
digitally signs a statement to the effect that X is the owner of this 
public key.
• This signed statement is known as a certificate, the commonly used 
standard for which is ITU-T X.509 (=ISO/IEC 9594-8).
• If I know the public key of the CA, I can verify any signatures it 
produces, and hence I can verify all the certificates it produces.
• This gives me a way of getting a reliable copy of any other entity’s 
public key.
• The CAs and the certificates they produce are collectively known as a 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
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The promise of a universal PKI
• A few years ago, PKI was the subject of huge amounts of hype.
• Companies producing PKI products (e.g. CA software) or 
providing PKI services suddenly (and temporarily!) became 
hugely valuable.
• In many cases the vision sold as part of this hype was of some 
kind of universal PKI, whereby every PC in the world would have 
a public key certificate, which could then be used for a huge 
range of purposes, e.g.:
– secure e-commerce;
– universal secure e-government;
– secure home banking;
– electronic signatures for all;
– …
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PKI – what happens in practice  I
• Of course, this has not happened.
• In the main, we have a large number of PKIs, but each one has 
been set up for a specific purpose.
• For example:
– companies have their own PKIs, used to support internal secure 
communications;
– MasterCard and Visa (and card issuing banks) have PKIs set up to
support EMV (used for to support smart card based credit/debit 
card transactions, e.. in parts of Europe);
– Internet web sites have certificates used to support SSL/TLS 
security.
• There are, of course, many explanations for this – one being the 
fact that the policies under which certificates are issued will 
depend on the context of use.
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PKI – what happens in practice  II
• More generally, PC users do not have the expertise or 
motivation to generate a signature key pair, and obtain a 
certificate for their public key.
• This can be seen from the failure of the SET e-commerce secure 
payment system, one of the major obstacles to the adoption of 
which was the need for every user to generate a key pair, and 
take a copy of their public key to their bank.
• End users cannot be expected to understand the operation of 
public key cryptography.
• Moreover, current PCs typically do not have a means for secure 
key storage (needed for the private key).
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TC – a universal security infrastructure?
• It seems possible that trusted computing may give us a 
universal security infrastructure ‘by the back door’.
• Every PC owner will have a crypto-capable PC, will have an 
asymmetric key pair in their TPM, and will have a public key 
certificate for the public key.
• Moreover, the TPM is capable of generating signature key pairs 
on demand, of using generated private keys to sign arbitrary 
data, and of providing secure storage for private keys.
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Possible problems
• The key pair provided in every TPM (when shipped to user) is 
not suitable for use as a general purpose key pair:
– although it is an RSA key pair, it is intended for use as an 
encryption/decryption key pair;
– the TPM does not enable its use for signing arbitrary data.
• The TPM is capable of generating an RSA key pair designed for 
signing (known as an AIK – Attestation Identity Key), and can 
also obtain an X.509 certificate for the public part of the AIK 
from an entity known as a Privacy-CA.
– However, the private part of the AIK cannot be used to sign 
arbitrary data.
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Solutions to problems
• Get the TPM to generate another signature key pair, and use an 
AIK to sign a ‘certificate’ for the public key.
• The private key of this key pair can be used to sign arbitrary 
data.
• This means that the PC now has a means of generating 
arbitrary numbers of signature key pairs (essentially 
automatically) and obtaining certificates for them.
• Only problems are:
a) There is a need to associate two certificates with each key pair
(the Privacy-CA certificate for the public AIK, and the AIK-signed 
certificate for the public key in use);
b) The AIK-signed certificate is not in the standard (X.509) format.
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Certificate ‘translation’
• A means of addressing these last two problems has been 
proposed by the TCG.
• They propose a special extension to PKCS#10 (PKCS#10 is a 
format for submitting public key certification requests to a CA).
• This extension (called SKAE) would allow a PC to submit the PC-
generated certificate (signed using an AIK) for the signature 
public key, along with other evidence, as part of a certification 
request.
• The CA would verify the certificate and evidence, and would 
then generate a new certificate for the PC public key.
• All these processes could be performed by a Java applet, which 
would give the PC user a secure and automatic means of joining 
a global PKI.
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Example 1 :  SSL client side authentication
• Currently, SSL is only used for unilateral authentication i.e. of 
the server to the client, mainly because client PCs typically do
not have key pairs and certificates.
• Precisely the procedure just described could give a means for a 
PC user to acquire a signature key pair and a public key 
certificate in order to support SSL client side authentication.
• This is described in greater detail in:
A. Alsaid and C. J. Mitchell, 'Preventing phishing attacks using trusted 
computing technology', in Proceedings of INC 2006, Sixth 
International Network Conference, Plymouth, UK, July 2006, 
pp.221-228.
• Related work, including implementations, is being conducted by 
the OpenTC project.
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Example 2:  Secure PC-based electronic 
signatures
• A considerable amount of work has gone into developing 
legislative and commercial frameworks for electronic signatures.
• However, such frameworks typically require a cumbersome 
registration procedure for users, and also some means of 
storing private keys securely.
• The possibility exists that, with the aid of the TPM in a PC, the 
PC itself can become a trusted platform for the implementation 
of a personal electronic signature capability, since it can provide 
the secure storage and also automatically perform the 
registration procedures. 
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Portability and privacy issues
• The problem remains that PCs are not typically in one-one 
correspondence with human users.
• That is, users have multiple PCs (and transferring secrets 
between TPMs is difficult), and PCs may have multiple users.
• In the latter case. issues may arise in holding a single user 
accountable for the behaviour of a PC.
• However, TPMs are ‘owned’ by a single user, which typically 
means that only one individual will be able to use the TPM-
protected keys.
• If users wish to have multiple ‘unlinkable’ identities, the TPM 
can support this, by generating new key pairs as required.  
(Privacy-preserving certification and use of cryptography is a 
key feature of the TCG specifications).
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Resources
• www.trustedcomputinggroup.org
• http://www.microsoft.com/windowsvista/default.aspx
• http://www.intel.com/technology/security/
• http://os.inf.tu-dresden.de/L4/LinuxOnL4/
• http://www.opentc.net/
• Siani Pearson (editor), Trusted Computing Platforms – TCPA 
Technology in Context, HP Invent.
• Chris Mitchell (editor), Trusted Computing, IEE (London), 2005.
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